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In the Eye of the Storm: the Italian Economy and the Eurozone Crisis 
Martin J. Bull 
 
The Eurozone crisis had a more significant and longer-lasting impact on Italy than on 
virtually any other Member State, with the effects still visible a decade after. The extent of the 
shock was surprising in view of progress Italy had apparently made in the 1990s in terms of 
enhancing its capacity to meet the demands of European Monetary Union. The explanation 
for this traumatic economic experience lies in Italy’s deep, long-term, structural tensions 
which were placed under severe pressure during the 1990s and which were cracked open by 
the 2011 sovereign debt crisis. These have had long-standing economic effects as well as  
political ramifications in terms of a significant change in the Italy-EU relationship. 
Keywords: Italian economy; Eurozone crisis; Europe; sovereign debt crisis; public debt; 
economic growth 
 
If the Eurozone crisis was, on the one hand, a reflection of the inherent structural weaknesses 
in the Eurozone edifice (Turner 2011; Schelke 2011) and the inadequate response of the 
European elites to manage the crisis (Underhill 2011), it was, on the other hand, characterised 
by the public indebtedness of the ‘old’ Southern European countries (Italy, Portugal, Greece 
and Italy)—popularly perceived as Europe’s ‘flaky southern fringe’ (Verney 2009, p. 1)—
and the collapse in confidence of the markets in their capacities to repay those debts (Bull 
2012). Of these countries, Italy stood out in terms of both size, significance and impact. True, 
it could be argued that Greece was the immediate problem, facing a real (some would say 
inevitable) risk of default, and, in any case, the other southern European countries were in a 
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similar predicament to that of Italy, facing low growth, high levels of public debt and 
downgrading of their credit ratings. Yet, while Ireland, Greece and Portugal were already, 
before 2011, receiving financial assistance from the EU, these economies were relatively 
small in the context of the Eurozone as a whole (Greece, for example, represented a mere 2.7 
per cent of the total Eurozone’s GDP). Italy’s public debt, by comparison, amounted to 
approximately one third of all Eurozone debt. Its problem was that it was too large to be 
bailed out – at least in the terms in which Greece was being considered. It was not surprising, 
therefore, that the main concern of European and international political and economic elites 
was, from 2011 (if not earlier), that of contagion to Italy, as, for example, expressed by then 
Director of the European Central Bank, Jean Claude-Trichet, and Antonio Borges, 
responsible for the IMF’s European Department (La Stampa, 20 September 2011 & 24 
September 2011).  
The resulting crisis, the daily figures on the ‘spread’ (the difference in the Italian-
German ten-year bond yield spread) and the eventual enforced resignation of Silvio 
Berlusconi as Prime Minster, placed Italy very much in the ‘eye of the storm’. The impact, 
moreover, was long-term, with a near decade of recurrent crisis, EU-imposed austerity and 
slow recovery. That has also resulted in a significant non-economic consequence: a marked 
change in Italy’s relationship with Europe, with Italian governments more hard-nosed about 
demands from the EU, and Italians more Eurosceptic than ever before. To simplify, ‘Europe’, 
as a consequence of the Eurozone crisis, is no longer widely seen as a model to which to 
aspire, but more of a burden: the vehicle of a German-inspired, inflexibly-imposed austerity 
and of a drop in Italians’ standard of living. This is a long way from the heady days of the 
1990s when Italy, against expectations, qualified for entry into the single currency and the 
country was widely seen as having been ‘rescued’ by Europe. The question, therefore, is: 
why was the impact of the Eurozone crisis on Italy so severe and long-lasting?;  or, to what 
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extent was the Eurozone crisis (alone) responsible for an economic ‘lost decade’, and  are the 
Italians right to identify Europe as the main cause of their economic woes since 2008? 
 This article attempts to answer these questions by first analysing the ‘lost decade’ that 
commenced in 2008 with the Eurozone crisis. It then, in the second section, contextualises 
the Eurozone crisis by outlining how the severity of the impact on Italy was, to a large extent, 
unexpected and unanticipated by both politicians and observers of the Italian political scene, 
and how this level of surprise inevitably placed focus on the Eurozone crisis as a highly 
‘disruptive’ element in Italian economic development. The article then, through an analysis of 
Italy’s economic performance prior to the Eurozone crisis and especially the fiscal crisis and 
loss of economic growth from the 1990s onwards, places the ‘disruptive’ element of the 
Eurozone crisis more clearly in historical context and helps explain why its impact was so 
severe in the Italian case.  
A Lost Decade? The Italian Economy During the Crisis (2008-17) 
For Italy, the crisis began in earnest in the second half of 2011 as contagion from the Greek 
economic crisis reached its shores, with a run on the Italian markets in August 2011, 
characterised by dramatic increases in the ‘bond spread’. The European Central Bank (ECB) 
became involved in the Italian emergency budget and the identification of a set of structural 
and financial reforms (Italy had been ‘policed’, in the words on one politician). Italy’s credit 
rating was downgraded by two of the main credit rating agencies, Standard & Poor’s (on 20 
September from A+ to A) and Moody’s (on 4 October from Aa2 to A2 with a negative 
outlook, this the first time it had downgraded Italy since May 1993), leaving Italy with the 
same credit rating as Malta, below countries such as Estonia and Slovenia, and above only 
Cyprus, Ireland, Portugal and Greece. The core of the Eurozone drama was subsequently 
played out during the following year and beyond (Jones 2012). The impact was severe not 
just in the short-term (Jones 2014) but also in terms of duration and recovery. Looking back 
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over roughly a decade, the figures in Table 1 outline this picture, but the table should be 
supplemented with comparisons with the Euro-area countries, which confirm Italy’s relative 
difficulties and failure to recover from the 2011 crisis.1  
If we start with growth, the figures reveal stagnation punctuated by four years (2008-
09, 2012-13) of contraction. Italy’s growth rates are almost the worst in the Eurozone, the 
main problem being a failure to recover after the 2011-12 recession. In the years 2013-16 
only Greece and Finland had worse growth rates, and predictions for 2017 and 2018 will 
leave Italy in bottom place. The root of this problem appears to be in labour productivity 
which, relative to the Euro-area countries, plummeted after 2010 and then flat-lined, leaving 
only Greece below Italy from 2013 onwards. If we look more closely at Unit Labour Costs 
(the ratio of compensation to employee to labour productivity) Italy’s, although falling (by 
the first quarter of 2017) by 9.2 per cent since reaching a peak in the fourth quarter of 2009, 
have in fact become comparatively even higher than the Euro-average which has fallen by a 
steeper 13 per cent, leaving Unit Labour Costs in Italy 10.8 per cent higher than the Euro-
average in 2017. Noticeably, countries with higher Unit Labour Costs at the peak of the crisis 
(Greece, Spain, Ireland) have since fallen below those of Italy, and in 2017 only seven of the 
Euro-area countries (Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta and Slovakia) 
have higher Unit Labour Costs than Italy.2  
There is also a problem of internationalisation of the economy as reflected in export 
and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) figures, and export figures. FDI inflows (as percentage 
of GDP) underwent a dramatic decline from 2.9 per cent in 2007 to -0.4 per cent in 2008, 
with the figure only rising to 1.5 per cent by 2016.3 A similar story pertains to FDI outflows 
which declined from 5.4 per cent in 2007 to 0.84 per cent in 2008, with the 2016 figure (1.2 
per cent) still considerably lower than that of 2007.4 However, this represents a relative 
improvement on the  Euro-average figures, where FDI inflows declined from 9.9 per cent in 
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2007 to 2.7 per cent in 2017, and outflows from 11.5 per cent in 2007 to 3.8 per cent in 2016. 
In the same period (2007-2016) that Italian exports as a percentage of GDP have increased by 
about 2.5 per cent (from 27.4 per cent to 29.9 percent), the Euro-average figures have 
increased by over 4.5 per cent (from 39.4 to 44.1 per cent), with Italy having been overtaken 
in this period by Spain and Greece, and left languishing in penultimate place (after France).5 
There are of course differences in performance across different sectors, and the specialised-
supplier (industrial district) sector has performed better (where Italy remains one of the top-
ranked exporters in textiles, clothing, leather goods and non-electronic machinery). However, 
the problem is one of scale, with a minority (about 20 per cent) of companies responsible for 
nearly all exports and producing 8 per cent of the national value-added (Bricco 2017, p. 2). 
Unemployment soared in the period after 2008, peaking in 2014 at 12.7 per cent of 
the workforce. In 2009 there were nine countries in the Euro-area with higher unemployment 
rates than Italy, including Germany, France and Belgium. By 2016 this had shrunk to just two 
(Greece and Spain), and Italy has particular problems. The percentage of those out of 
employment for longer than 12 months (the long-term unemployment rate) has, since 2014, 
been higher than all other Euro-area countries except Greece and the Slovak Republic. Youth 
unemployment (15-24 year olds) peaked at 42.7 per cent in 2014, and since 2013 only Spain 
and Greece have had higher levels. There is also, in Italy, a specific problem of 
unemployment levels in the South which have been running at over 20 per cent (close to 
double those of the Centre and North of the country). For those in employment, average 
wages were still lower in 2016 than they were in 2008. For the entire decade, only Greece, 
Portugal, Slovenia, Estonia and the Slovak Republic have had lower average wages. 
These difficulties are reflected in an almost consistent decline in tax revenue over the 
decade, especially after 2014, with only Slovenia, Portugal, Spain, Estonia and Greece having 
lower annual tax revenues from 2014 onwards. The difficulties are also reflected in a collapse 
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in internal demand over the decade, while most other countries have witnessed a gradual 
increase. The forecast for 2017 leaves Italy with the lowest growth in demand in the 
Eurozone in 2017, with the economy becoming deflationary in 2016.   
 
Table 1: Italian Economy 2008-16: Main Indicators  
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Annual growth 
(per cent GDP) 
-1.1 -5.5 1.6 0.7 -2.9 -1.7 0.2 0.6 0.8 
Public deficit 
(per cent GDP) 
-2.7 -5.3 -4.2 -3.7 -2.9 -2.9 -3.0 -2.7 -2.4 
Public debt 
(per cent GDP) 
113 126 124.9 117.9 136.2 143.7 155.8 157.3 + 
Inflation 
(annual growth 
rate, per cent) 
3.3 0.8 1.5 2.8 3.0 1.2 0.2 0.0 -0.1 
Tax revenue 
(EUR capita)* 
11.3k 11.0k 11.0k 11.3k 11.8k 11.5k 11.4k 11.5k + 
Unemployment 
(per cent 
labour force) 
6.7 7.7 8.4 8.4 10.7 12.1 12.7 11.9 11.7 
Youth 
unemployment 
(per cent of 
youth labour 
force) 
21.2 25.3 27.9 29.1 35.3 40.0 42.7 40.3 37.8 
Productivity 
(GDP per hour 
worked) (2010 
= 100) 
100 97.8 100.0 100.5 100.2 101.1 101.3 101.1 100.3 
Labour 
productivity 
(2010 = 1) 
1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Internal 
Demand 
(annual growth 
rate) 
-1.2 -4.2 1.9 -0.5 -5.7 -2.7 0.3 1.0 0.9 
Average wages 
(EUR)* 
26,644 25,158 26,456 25,004 26,608 25,298 25,418 30,726 + 
Long term 
interest rates 
(per cent per 
annum) 
4.7 4.3 4.0 5.4 5.5 4.3 2.9 1.7 1.5 
* Original figures in USD, conversion to EUR based on yearly average exchange rates 
(https://www.ofx.com/en-gb/forex-news/historical-exchange-rates/yearly-average-rates/) 
 + Figures not available 
Source: OECD (2017) 
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As a consequence, governments have struggled to keep the public deficit within the 
EU’s three per cent rule, which was breached every year between 2009 and 2011. However, it 
has to be said that this was not out of keeping with the rest of the Euro-area, since only six 
countries between 2009 and 2016 managed to keep within this limit, and Italy’s average for 
those years (3.3 per cent) was better than ten other countries. Indeed, despite the calamitous 
state of growth and productivity, there has been an effort to secure fiscal consolidation in the 
years since 2009. If one looks at the average primary balance 2009-16 excluding the public 
debt burden, Italy was second only to Germany in producing the highest primary surplus (1.2 
per cent), and one of only six countries to produce an average surplus or neutral balance, a 
figure that improves even further if the structural balance is adjusted for the effects of the 
economic cycle by excluding interest as a percentage of potential GDP (Ministero 
dell’Economia e delle Finanze 2017). That achievement, however, did nothing to reduce the 
public debt, only slowed its previous rate of growth  (between 2009 and 2016, it grew more 
slowly than seven other Euro-area countries). Italian public debt started the decade as the 
highest in the Euro area (save for Greece), and stayed that way throughout, except one year 
(2011) where its figure was higher even than Greece. By 2015 it had reached more than 150 
per cent of GDP.  
Finally, the result of years of ongoing sovereign debt crisis has contributed to re-
producing a Eurozone banking crisis, but with Italy this time at the centre of it. This proved 
to be another surprise. Writing at the beginning of the Eurozone crisis, Quaglia (2009, pp. 12-
13) noted that ‘Amongst the various European countries, Italy has not been hard hit by the 
financial turmoil: no Italian bank (or foreign bank operating in Italy) has failed, nor has it 
been rescued through direct public intervention. Moreover, with the exception of two Italian 
banks…no Italian bank has come under severe strain and the market’s perception of their 
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solvency has remained relatively good.’ Nearly a decade later all that changed, as European 
stress tests in 2016 revealed the scale of the problems in the Italian banking system. Nearly a 
fifth of all Italian banking loans (to a value of 360 billion Euro) are classified as troubled 
(meaning unlikely ever to be repaid), and this equates to 40 per cent of all such bad loans in 
the Euro-area. If a systemic banking crisis were to unfold it could be beyond the reach of (and 
rules governing) a public bail out (Pavesi 2017). While it is clear that several of the banks got 
into a critical condition through poor lending and decision-making, the Governor of the Bank 
of Italy has argued that the primary cause is ‘bad economic conditions, seven years of almost 
continuous recession … Banking is a symptom, not the cause’ (quoted in Goodman 2016).  
Be that as it may, the current banking crisis is at the same time threatening bank lending on 
which future economic growth depends. The banking crisis is, therefore, a slow-burning fuse 
that could, over time, dwarf all other economic issues. 
 
Contextualising the Eurozone Crisis 
Was it the Eurozone crisis that caused a change in the Italian economy’s fortunes? Or were 
there are other factors at work which simply made the economy’s handling of that crisis more 
difficult than in many other European countries? Much depends on the interpretation (and 
‘narrative’) one adopts to understand the Eurozone crisis in all its considerable complexity. 
Jones (2015, 2016), for example, outlines three differing interpretations in the literature as to 
why some nations experienced a greater impact than others from the Eurozone crisis: 
‘financial’, ‘competitiveness’ and ‘indebtedness’. The ‘financial’ emphasises the ‘disruptive’ 
‘sudden stop’ nature of the crisis as one primarily of contagion: capital liberalisation and an 
inflow of capital followed by a shock to the confidence of overseas investors in one country 
after another, who (rationally or irrationally) then liquidate their assets triggering a balance of 
payments crisis. The other two interpretations emphasise the performance of the national 
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economies in the run up to the crisis – specifically in relation to their levels of public debt and 
their competitiveness/growth – as explanations. Adopting the specific perspective of the least 
number of anomalies and what should be the policy response to the crisis, Jones (2015) 
argues that a financial interpretation offers the best leverage. However, as he also argues, the 
explanations are not mutually exclusive: all the interpretations depend on the same three 
elements, they simply differ in their sequencing and correlations.  
If we turn to the Italian case, then the question that arises is, given the long-term 
impact on the Italian economy of the Eurozone crisis, what was the state of the economy in 
the run-up to the crisis? Was the crisis largely inevitable and a consequence of the dire state 
of the economy, or was it an unanticipated ‘disruptive’ stop to an economy in a reasonable 
state of health? Di Quirico (2010, p. 16), for example, has argued that ‘In Italy, the global 
crisis has impacted on a system that had deteriorated following twenty years of political 
instability and economic decline. So, it has only worsened conditions in a country already in 
crisis.’ Yet, irrespective of the possible accuracy of such an assertion, it does not - in its broad 
two-decade sweep - account for the apparent achievements of Italian policy-makers in getting 
Italy into the Euro in the 1990s, the broader context of change this apparently represented and 
the expectations generated by these achievements. Indeed, returning to the literature of that 
period suggests that the largely popular interpretation of the Eurozone crisis (that it is chiefly 
responsible for Italy’s woes) has some pedigree.  
Between 1992 and 1998, five governments brought about a drastic change in the state 
of the government finances, resulting—against all expectations—in Italy qualifying for 
European Monetary Union (EMU) in the first wave of entrants in 1999. Instead of primary 
deficits there were substantial primary surpluses, the level of public debt began to decline 
after 1994, and the deficit declined from double-digit figures to be within the Maastricht’s 
Treaty requirement of three per cent. This was achieved through a mix of expenditure cuts, 
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tax increases and new taxes, combined with the commencement of structural reforms in 
pensions, welfare, labour relations and privatisation, as well as reforms to budgetary 
procedures which enhanced the role of the executive and Treasury (Radaelli 2001, pp. 28-9). 
Underpinning these changes was an apparent new elite consensus amongst a group of 
economists, technocrats and politicians, which had originated in negotiations over the 
Maastricht Treaty and was based on the idea that the increased demands of the ‘European 
constraint’ presented an opportunity to overcome the limitations of the old Italian political 
class in furthering the goals of sound public finance for long-term international gains (Dyson 
& Featherstone 1996; Radaelli 1998). The Prime Ministers of the 1990s—Amato, Ciampi, 
Dini, Prodi and D’Alema—adhered to this new approach, two of these (Ciampi and Dini) 
running non-party technical governments, the former going on to become the Treasury 
Minister between 1996 and 1999 in the first governments of both Prodi and D’Alema. Italy 
was described as having been ‘rescued by Europe’ or ‘condemned to success’ (e.g. Ferrera & 
Gualmini 2004; Di Palma et al. 2000) through the pressures exerted by Europe as a form of 
‘external constraint’ (Dyson & Featherstone 1996). Furthermore, looking forwards, observers 
tended to emphasise the continued, if not increased, presence of the ‘external constraint’ 
deriving from an independent European Central Bank in charge of monetary policy, the EU’s 
Growth and Stability Pact and the role of EMU in providing financial stability (e.g. Radaelli 
1990, p. 8; 2001, pp. 234-235). In the late 1990s, Mario Monti, the Italian European 
Commissioner (1995-2004, and responsible for the single market until 1999) referred to the 
consolidation of a ‘culture of stability’ (quoted in Di Palma 2000, p. 43) in Italy thanks to the 
Maastricht Treaty, a formidable achievement in view of the country’s long-term reputation 
for instability. Moreover, at the first serious test of this apparent new-found capacity, the 
2007-08 banking crisis, Italy’s solidity seemed to be confirmed, since the country emerged 
relatively unscathed (Quaglia 2009, pp. 12-13).  
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Yet, a mere three years later, when the banking crisis of 2008-09 gave way to a 
sovereign debt crisis in 2010-11 Italy’s image shifted dramatically from solidity to being on 
the brink. In this line of thinking, the Eurozone crisis was a sudden ‘disruptive’ element in 
Italy’s economic development. If so, then the questions are why the expectations of the 1990s 
were dashed and why many of the observers of that period got it so wrong? What happened 
to the so-called ‘culture of stability’? To answer this question requires an assessment of the 
two key national interpretations of the Eurozone crisis in relation to Italy (public 
indebtedness and competitiveness/growth) prior to the crisis, especially unpicking 
developments in the 1990s and 2000s, and assessing what happened to the apparent economic 
achievements of the 1990s. 
 
The Long Roots of the Fiscal Crisis: Public Deficits and Public Debt 
For all the economic achievements of the 1990s, and the optimism generated by them, it 
should not be forgotten that they came, in fact, on the back of the biggest political and 
economic crisis in the Italian post-war period. The dramatic events of 1992-94 are, of course, 
remembered chiefly for the wave of corruption scandals. Yet, it should not be forgotten that 
this crisis was accompanied by economic turmoil in the form of a collapse in confidence of 
the markets and an alarming run on the currency that led to the lira being withdrawn from the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in September 1992. While, at the time, it looked as if this 
was a consequence of the political situation, in fact the economic crisis had much deeper 
roots of its own, bringing to an end an economic cycle that could be dated from Italy’s entry 
into the ERM in 1978. This had been anticipated to correct the distortions in Italy’s model of 
growth in the 1970s, based on public deficits, state subsidies to firms, repeated devaluations 
of the lira, high inflation and rising national debt. Yet, while a restructuring of industry did 
occur in the early 1980s and inflation was brought down, the ERM, as an ‘external 
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constraint’, failed to enforce macro-economic discipline, largely because, in the period until 
the mid-1980s, it operated on a flexible basis, with frequent realignment of currencies in the 
system. Consequently, the distortions in the Italian political economy, especially regarding 
deficits and public debt, continued throughout the 1980s. Public debt as a percentage of GDP 
rose from 41.2 per cent 1970 to 59 per cent in 1980 and again to 97.8 per cent in 1990, the 
latter rise being unprecedented in western democracies. By 1991 only Japan and United 
States had more outstanding debt than Italy in the world, and its ratio of outstanding debt to 
GDP was approximately twice the average of the other members of the European Union. 
Interest paid on the debt rose from 5.3 per cent in 1980 to 9.6 per cent in 1990. This was not a 
problem to do with economic growth since, apart from one negative year (1975) and low 
figures in the recession of the early 1980s, economic growth was consistent and even 
punctuated by a so-called ‘second economic miracle’ in the 1980s. Rather, it was one of 
growth in public expenditure outstripping that of revenue. For example, while total revenue 
rose from 30 per cent of GDP in 1964 to 39 per cent in 1985, expenditure rose from 29 per 
cent to 51 per cent, thus preventing any reduction in the deficit (Franco & Rizzo 2009, pp. 
130-31). 
The economic crisis of the early 1990s was hastened along by a tightening of the 
ERM. Currency realignments became less frequent in the late 1980s, and in 1990 the lira 
entered the ‘narrow’ band of the ERM, accompanied by the complete liberalisation of capital 
movements. It was followed by the decision to move towards EMU through the formulation 
of five convergence criteria in the Maastricht Treaty, the two most demanding for Italy of 
which were that budget deficits should be no more than three per cent of GDP (Italy’s was in 
the region of 9 per cent) and that public debt should be no more than 60 per cent of GDP 
(Italy’s was over 100 per cent). The drama of that crisis, and the resulting performance 
against the key Maastricht criteria, explain why few observers or participants expected Italy 
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to qualify in the first wave of entrants for EMU. Prime Minister Lamberto Dini (1995-1996) 
attempted to postpone the Maastricht timetable because he feared that the adjustment could 
not be achieved in time, and the European Commission’s first formal assessment (1997) of 
the likely first entrants noted that Italy was still adrift. This raises the question of the exact 
nature of the achievement of meeting Maastricht (and the optimism it generated amongst 
politicians and observers) and how lasting it was ever likely to be. It could be argued that it 
was based on two assumptions (one economic and the other political) whose veracity had yet 
to be tested: first, that it demonstrated Italy’s economic ability to achieve fiscal sustainability 
(as opposed to temporary fiscal consolidation); and second, that it reflected the replacement 
of the old Christian Democratic ‘regime’ with a new elite who had brought to budgetary 
policy-making a new long-term ‘culture of stability’. Both these assumptions proved to be 
more apparent than real. 
On the economic front, while the Italian government achieved the necessary fiscal 
adjustment to enter the single currency, it did not guarantee that it would maintain this into 
the future. In fact, much depended on the nature of the adjustment undertaken in the pre-entry 
phase. How a nation-state consolidated its finances to meet the Maastricht criteria would have 
an inevitable impact on future sustainability, since ‘budget consolidations relying too heavily 
on the revenue side by raising taxes rather than on the expenditure side by cutting spending 
are less likely to be successful and sustainable’ (Blavoukos & Pagoulatos 2008, p. 234). 
Successful consolidations favour a reduction in government spending over increasing 
government revenues, reductions in current government spending over public investment 
spending, and tackling politically sensitive issues such as public expenditure on subsidies, 
transfers and wages. ‘As a result, successful consolidations are characterised by continued 
improvements in the budget balance following the conclusion of the consolidation phase’ 
(ibid., 234). Significantly, it was possible to achieve fiscal consolidation and meet the 
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Maastricht criteria through macro-economic changes which did not necessarily touch on 
deeper structural reforms that would be necessary to sustainability over the longer-term. 
Moreover, the Maastricht criteria, although rigid in and of themselves, were not prescriptive 
in terms of how member states should meet those criteria, if anything giving ‘more emphasis 
to fiscal consolidation rather than fiscal sustainability’, thus largely overlooking the quality of 
fiscal adjustment and therefore fiscal sustainability in the new currency (Blavoukos & 
Pagoulatos 2008, pp. 233-234; Dyson 2006, p. 11). Perhaps inevitably, in view of the short 
time period between the signing of the Treaty and its deadline, a large non-structural 
component would be expected, and in fact, the one criterion which had the strongest 
implications for sustainability—reducing the public sector debt to 60 per cent of GDP—was, 
in the run-up to the deadline, relaxed to a requirement of evidence of a steady decrease in the 
public debt. The Italian consolidation in the pre-entry phase was achieved primarily through 
raising tax revenue (including a special Euro-tax) and capital spending reductions, but with 
little reduction in government primary expenditure and only limited structural reforms (which 
were started, for example in pensions, but remained either impartial or incomplete) (Bardone 
and Reitano 2009). Once the currency was launched, moreover, the EU relaxed its own rules. 
Fiscal consolidation and sustainability were meant to be enforced through the Stability and 
Growth Pact’s Excessive Debt Procedure for those countries in breach of the three per cent 
rule, yet a more flexible stance was adopted in 2002 in the face of the French and German 
economies struggling to meet the rule. This undermined the SGP’s credibility and reduced the 
pressure on countries (especially the Southern European states) to continue with fiscal 
consolidation.  
On the political front, once Maastricht was achieved, the new consensus or ‘culture of 
stability’ began to evaporate, if indeed such a culture ever really existed. While there is little 
doubt that a new approach was adopted amongst the Italian team negotiating the Maastricht 
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Treaty which carried over into Italian domestic politics as a result of the vacuum created by 
the 1992-93 crisis, at the same time, the views of a number of other politicians and parties 
were always more ambivalent: accepting that failing to enter the single currency would be 
unthinkable in a country so pro-European, but, on the other hand, recognising that the macro-
economic changes necessary to meet Maastricht would require unpopular tax rises and cuts in 
expenditure. However, several parties voted against the Maastricht Treaty in Parliament, two 
of which (Communist Refoundation and a reconstructed Italian Social Movement named 
National Alliance) would serve in future governing coalitions, and several politicians voting 
for the Treaty at the same time made clear their views that the convergence criteria should be 
subject to some flexibility (Gualdesi 1994, pp. 42-47). This was particularly noteworthy with 
respect to politicians of Forza Italia, the most significant of the new political parties to 
emerge in the 1990s (Dastoli 1996, pp. 172-173). Finally, if the political composition of the 
new consensus was oriented towards the new centre-left which (save for eight months) 
governed Italy between June 1992 and June 2001 (Di Quirico 2003, pp. 16-17), it was 
followed by five years (2001-06) of the more Eurosceptical centre-right under Berlusconi.  
It was, therefore, perhaps not surprising that in the early 2000s Italy came close to 
breaching the three per cent rule (requiring one-off corrective measures), that public debt as a 
percentage of GDP remained largely unchanged and that the drive behind structural reforms, 
essential to the transition from fiscal consolidation to fiscal sustainability (pensions, labour 
market, welfare, privatisation) faltered. Annual budgets no longer prioritised reducing the 
deficit, which began to widen in the first half of the 2000s, as a consequence of only modest 
growth in GDP (partly suppressed by the dependence on tax increases and capital-spending 
reductions to enter the Euro). Furthermore, without the more structural measures being 
progressively implemented to replace the temporary measures of the mid-late 1990s, Italian 
governments—faced with unexpected low growth—reverted to further temporary measures 
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from 2001 onwards (e.g. sales of real estate, tax amnesties, new legislation to generate future 
tax revenue).  
The impact of this deterioration on the levels of public debt was apparent. While there 
was, on the face of it, an impressive reduction in the level of public debt (about 14 per cent) 
in the decade before the beginning of the 2008 world recession (1997-2007), most of this 
was, in fact, accounted for by temporary, extraordinary measures (Franco & Rizza 2009, p. 
136), and, with primary current expenditure rising faster than GDP in the first half of the 
2000s, the primary balance shrank from 6.6 per cent of GDP in 1997 to almost zero in 2005, 
with the consequences that the ratio of debt to GDP began rising again in 2005 to 105.8 per 
cent. In that year, the European Council alerted Italy to its excessive deficit and made it 
subject to the procedure, giving it until 2007 to address the situation.  
This is not to suggest that Italy’s fiscal situation was a direct cause of the crisis. 
Italy’s long-term public debt was always manageable, not only because the Italian 
government had become accustomed to doing so, but also because of who owned it. In 
contrast with its southern European neighbours, such as Greece and Portugal, as well as 
Ireland, Italy was not indebted primarily to foreign central and other banks (and especially to 
the EU’s core countries). Italy’s debt was primarily domestically owned: ‘it has a relative 
conservative banking sector, a large stockpile of domestic savings, and even larger stockpile 
of household wealth’ (Jones 2012, p. 87). Consequently, when the banking crisis began in 
2008 and overseas money was withdrawn from those countries highly dependent upon it, they 
entered into crisis while Italy could continue to manage its indebtedness and in the short-term 
retained the confidence of overseas investors. Nevertheless, the sheer size of the Italian 
public debt burden—and the evidence that Italy was, especially with the interest paid on the 
deb, struggling to move from fiscal consolidation to fiscal sustainability—exposed the 
country to the risk of contagion; and this occurred when banks, facing substantial losses on 
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their loans to Greece and other countries, lost confidence in Italy’s ability to re-pay its debt 
and therefore in investing in Italy’s sovereign debt refinancing (Jones 2012, pp. 88-89). The 
resulting crisis revealed ‘a potentially lethal connection between weak banks invested in risky 
sovereign debt and governments too indebted to prop up the banks’ (Barber 2017). 
 
The Long-Term Loss of Growth 
The figures for economic growth and productivity in the 2008-17 decade make miserable 
reading. However, they have to be placed in a longer context, for over a period of fifteen 
years, the Italian economy had been losing its ‘social capacity for growth’ (Toniolo 2013, p. 
28). Long before the Eurozone crisis there was an extended debate about the so-called 
‘decline’ of the Italian economy (e.g. Nardozzi 2004; Toniolo & Visco 2004; Saltari & 
Travaglini 2006), the roots of which were commonly located in a transformation of the world 
economy in ways that constituted serious challenges to Italy’s postwar economic growth 
model (Battilani & Fauri 2014, ch. 5). 
First, there was the rapid diffusion of new technologies in the early 1990s following 
the end of the Cold War. Italy failed to exploit this so-called ‘new economy’ to the degree of 
other countries (in terms of adoption of new technologies in existing firms to boost 
productivity, and the creation of new firms based on those new technologies) both because of 
the prevalence of small and medium enterprises using more traditional methods of production 
and the archaic nature of Italy’s state regulation, where there have been significant barriers to 
product innovation, labour market rigidities, low investment in research and infrastructure 
and inadequacies in the educational system (Trento 2003, pp. 1088-1091).  
Second, a broader process of globalisation of the world economy in finance, 
technology and services began, with the breaking down of trade barriers. Since then, 
competition between national economies has been increasingly determined by their levels of 
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international integration in terms of the capacity of national firms to establish a presence in 
international markets as well as the attractiveness of a country to multinational presence, as 
reflected in import/export levels and (incoming and outgoing) foreign direct investment 
(FDI), which are also an essential means of diffusing new technologies. This has constituted a 
challenge to Italy which has always attracted low levels of FDI because of the low innovative 
capacity of existing firms and the costs of setting up and doing business there, thus 
suppressing further the already weak capacities of Italian firms to increase their FDI abroad, 
many of which have tended to prioritise domestic investment (especially in the South). Under 
the full force of competition and the ending of state support and favourable funding rates, 
large firms in Italy began to find themselves in difficulties in the 1990s. The state sector of 
the economy began to undergo partial privatisation while large private firms, accustomed to 
state support and protective practices, found their competitive edge dented by changes in 
corporate governance and the globalisation of industrial and financial markets. By the turn of 
the Millennium there were questions being asked about the long-term viability of large 
industry in Italy (e.g. Trento 2012; Berta 2016). There was a consistent decline in the average 
size of Italian firms (as measured in number of workers) which, by 2008, had shrunk to only 
half the average of the five main EU countries, entailing a reduction in research and 
development during a period when the adoption of new technology was needed (Toniolo 
2013, pp. 29-30). 
Third, there began a geo-economic reshaping of the world economy with the 
emergence of countries competing directly with the old economies of Europe. This included 
central and eastern European countries which joined the European Union in 2004 and, more 
importantly for Italy, the rise of the Asian economies which witnessed a shift in world trade 
away from Europe and the emergence of new economic powerhouses. In particular, the rapid 
economic growth of China posed a significant challenge to Italy because it struck at the heart 
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of those ‘Made in Italy’ goods in which Italian small and medium sized enterprises had 
become market leaders in previous decades (Onida 2004).  
These factors were already having a suppressing effect on Italy’s economic growth 
long before the launch of the single currency (indeed, despite the lira depreciating by roughly 
30 per cent between 1992 and 1995, economic performance in the 1990s was the worst of any 
decade previously since the war), one of the main effects of which was, for Italy, a loss of 
competitiveness. While there are different measures of competitiveness and while global 
figures overlook the performance of individual sectors (see, for example, Tiffin 2014), it is 
generally accepted that high inflation and the strengthening of the Euro, which could not be 
counter-balanced through a devaluation of the currency, led to a worsening of Italy’s current 
accounts. At the same time, the European Central Bank’s setting of a single nominal interest 
rate for all of the Euro-area had the effect of bringing down real (i.e. accounting for inflation) 
interest rates: in the decade 1999-2008, average long-term interest rates in Italy were 2.2 per 
cent compared with 6.2 per cent for the previous decade. This meant that, despite the loss of 
competitiveness, growth could be maintained through easier credit (enhanced by the 
liberalisation of banking regulations in the single market) and more manageable deficits. As a 
result, the loss of competitiveness did not lead to a reduction in wage rates and more flexible 
labour markets in order to maintain growth and employment rates (Le Cacheux 2010, pp. 50-
51). And this masked several economic weaknesses (low productivity, high labour costs and 
other structural problems) as well as obviating the need to do something about them. The 
competitiveness of Italian goods fell by 20 per cent between 1995 and 2002, Italy dropping 
below China and Canada to sixth place in the list of the world’s biggest exporters (Trento 
2003, p. 1093). Average growth between 1990 and 2001 was 1.7 per cent which was almost 
half that of the previous decade, and below the European average. Industrial productivity 
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increased by an average of only 1.4 per cent over the same period, against 2.6 per cent for the 
1980s. 
Italy was not unique in this sense. On the contrary, it could be argued that the Euro 
encouraged the expansion of the southern European economies, but the financial markets did 
not function effectively to impose ‘discipline’ on them in terms of enforcing structural 
reforms in the labour market and elsewhere (Tombazos 2011, p. 34). At the same time, the 
Euro exacerbated severe demand imbalances through German banks lending to the southern 
European states, thus creating demand for German exports, exporting credit dependence and 
increasing the gap between southern European deficits and German surpluses (Bagnai 2014, 
ch. 2; Featherstone 2011, p. 200). Yet, for all that, the Italian economy remained 
characterised by continued sluggish growth. While average growth rates for the decade after 
the launch of the Euro (1999-2008) were strong in Greece (4.15 per cent) and Spain (3.54 per 
cnet)—with the Spanish case also marked by a housing bubble—Italy averaged 1.36 per cent, 
well below the average growth rate of 2.12 per cent for the Euro area overall.  
As with public indebtedness, the long-term loss of competitiveness and decline in 
economic growth were not direct causes of the Eurozone crisis insofar as ‘countries did not 
get into crisis because they lost competitiveness. They may have lost competitiveness and 
fallen into crisis, but the two developments are not causally connected’ (Jones 2016, p. 80). 
Yet, there is no doubt that the pre-existing state of its competitiveness has made it more 
difficult to recover from that crisis. With historic drops in manufacturing employment, 
productivity, exports and world export market share, the Italian economy is no easy position 
to recover, especially when it is, at the same time, hampered by a significant public debt and 
a banking system made fragile by a large percentage of non-performing loans.  
 
Conclusion: Economic Impact, Political Ramifications  
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For the Italian economy, the 2008-17 decade was almost entirely contextualised by the 
Eurozone crisis. At peak of the crisis (2011-12), moreover, the Italian economy was in the 
eye of the storm: in a less critical condition than Greece but much more significant to the 
Eurozone and its future. The intensity of the impact and Italy’s pivotal role in the crisis was 
not anticipated. The crisis for Italy was primarily caused by contagion, it was largely 
financial in nature (a collapse in confidence of investors) with its dynamics beyond national 
control. At the same time, and essentially for the same reasoning, the crisis did not change 
the essential trajectory of the Italian economy but rather exacerbated existing trends, making  
it more difficult for the economy to recover; indeed, it is fair to say that 15 years of poor 
performance left the economy unable to withstand the impact of a crisis of such magnitude. It 
follows, therefore, that to understand the Italian economy today, one needs to go back beyond  
2008 to the early 1990s. Indeed, it is probably more accurate to identify the 1990s as a 
watershed decade which was as—if not more—important than the decade ushered in by the 
world economic crisis of 2008, dramatic as the latter was. Ironically, in the 1990s, precisely 
in a period when observers and Italian politicians viewed a fundamental change taking place 
amongst the Italian political class in its approach to the public finances, the motors of long-
term economic growth were faltering. This was a result of transformations taking place in the 
world economy combined with Italy’s entry into the single currency, all of which were 
challenging the long-standing tenets of the Italian postwar model of growth. The entry into 
the single currency in particular changed the macro-economic regulatory framework within 
which Italy had long operated, replacing the constraint of the market with an institutional 
constraint in the form of the financial rules set by the EU. For an economy based on a model 
of growth based on deficit budgeting, high public debt and depreciations of the currency, 
adjusting to this new framework proved a serious challenge. 
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Recovery from the Eurozone crisis has, therefore, been a long and slow process, and 
Italy remains a country which continues to worry the EU—as well as Deutsch Bank (Martin 
2017)—because of its size and significance to the Eurozone. The European Commission, in 
November 2016, adopted the ‘Alert Mechanism Report’, identifying Italy as one of the 
Member States needing in-depth review. In its subsequent report of 22 May 2017 it 
concluded that ‘Italy is experiencing excessive macroeconomic imbalances. High government 
debt and protracted weak productivity dynamics imply risks with cross-border relevance, in a 
context of non-performing loans and unemployment. The need for action to reduce the risk of 
adverse effects on the Italian economy and, given its size and cross-border relevance, on the 
economic and monetary union, is particularly important’ (European Commission 2017, p. 3). 
The recommendations essentially follow the pattern of old: greater fiscal discipline, reforms 
to encourage growth and structural reforms to improve productivity. 
Finally, the effects of the Eurozone crisis have not been just economic but political 
too. Indeed, the political ramifications are likely to be of greater duration, specifically in 
relation to Italy’s longstanding relationship to Europe, which has undergone fundamental 
change in two significant respects. First, while the EU’s policing of the Italian government’s 
management of the economy no longer comes as a shock – as it did in the early period of the 
crisis – its nature is no longer regarded as in the past as inherently benign. In 2012, of course, 
the Italian government accepted the EU’s Fiscal Compact (officially known as the Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance) which circumscribes national budgetary sovereignty 
and, in the Italian case, means shaving off approximately two per cent of GDP annually for 
years to come. Yet, research has shown that the motivation for this acceptance on the part of 
the Italian government was not driven by conventional notions of the value of the EU as an 
‘external constraint’ (which had shaped the consensus until the 1990s), but rather by simple 
fears of market punishment (Moschella 2017). That has tended to be confirmed by the 
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approach of Italian governments since the crisis, where we have witnessed an increasing 
tendency to contest EU proposals on fiscal consolidation and, in negotiations, to argue for 
greater recognition of cyclical conditions. This became a hallmark, for example, of the Renzi 
government of 2014-16, an approach which paved the way for allowances in the 2017 
Stability Programme for the impact of the migrant crisis in southern Italy and the earthquake 
in the central regions. The EU is seen as having been superseded in its role as a benign 
‘external constraint.’ Indeed, it could be argued that Renzi views the situation as having been 
reversed, with Italian politics now acting as an active and legitimate ‘constraint’ on the EU 
(Jones 2017, p. 61). The Italy-EU relationship has become more testy, with governments 
challenging not just the specifics of EU budgetary requirements but also the broader policy of 
austerity.  
Second, Italians have become more Eurosceptic than ever before. Europe is no longer 
seen as a model of good governance to which to aspire and Italy is no longer viewed as being 
‘rescued’ by Europe. Europe’s austerity policy is viewed by a majority of Italians as not 
working, and they also feel that the policy is in the interests of just a few countries despite the 
existence of realistic alternatives (Andretta 2018). Trust in the EU amongst Italians suffered a 
decline from 56.8 per cent in 2007 to a low point of 27 per cent in 2013 (recovering to 33.7 
per cent in 2016). Satisfaction in EU democracy underwent a similar decline from 55.8 per 
cent in 2007 to a low point of 33.7 per cent in 2014 (recovering to 47.2 per cent in 2016). The 
customary wide gap between Italians’ very poor satisfaction with their own democracy and 
that of EU democracy shrank during the crisis. The Euro, moreover, has become the 
particular focus of Italian anger, viewed as responsible for the austerity that was imposed on 
Italy following the Eurozone crisis. Support for the Euro amongst Italians declined from 72.9 
per cent in 2007 to 59.2 per cent in 2016 (Batsaikhan & Darvas 2017). Consequently, a 
debate on leaving the Euro gathered pace in 2017, with two parties (the Five Star Movement 
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and the Northern League) proposing abandoning the single currency and Berlusconi’s Forza 
Italia the adoption of a parallel currency (Politi 2017). In short, only 20 years after Romano 
Prodi passed his Euro super tax to qualify for the Euro and less than ten years since 
Berlusconi’s steep increases in taxation to keep the country in it, Italy was headed for its 
2018 national elections with only one mainstream party (the Democratic Party, PD) in favour 
of staying in the single currency. The political ramifications from the Eurozone crisis could 
yet produce another watershed moment in Italy’s long-term political and economic 
development.  
 
The author thanks Erik Jones as well as the anonymous referees for their comments and 
suggestions on an earlier draft of this article. The usual disclaimer applies. 
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